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In 1996 Kocher [1] showed that given certain timing information, it was pos-
sible to determine the secret decryption exponent used in RSA encryptions. His
method required knowledge of approximately 250 ciphertexts, the amount of CPU
time used to decrypt the ciphertexts with the secret exponent, and the public mod-
ulus n. When the first k bits of the secret exponent were known, Kocher’s data
showed that with 85% accuracy, he could guess the next bit in in the secret expo-
nent. Since then, much effort has been made to counteract timing attacks on RSA
encryption, often at the expense of computation time for the user. Kocher’s com-
putations were all completed on a 120-MHz Pentium computer running MSDOS.
CPU speeds have increased in the last 18 years and how a machine processes com-
mands has changed. In addition, elliptic curve encryption has become a preferred
cryptosystem. We want to understand how these changes affect the feasibility of a
timing attack.
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1.1.1 Elliptic Curve Encryption
Elliptic curve encryption is based on the group law for elliptic curve structures.
Given two points on a curve, when added together, one gets another point on the
curve. However, the addition of points on elliptic curves depends on the points given.
Let E be an elliptic curve defined by y2 = x3+Ax+B and P = (x1, y1), Q = (x2, y2)
be points on the curve. Then P + Q = R = (x3, y3) for projective coordinates is
defined as:
1. If x1 6= x2, then
x3 = m
2 − x1 − x2, y3 = m(x1 − x3)− y1, where m = y2−y1x2−x1
2. If x1 = x2, but y1 6= y2, then P +Q =∞
3. If P = Q and y1 6= 0, then
x3 = m




4. If P = Q and y1 = 0, then P +Q =∞
Additionally, P +∞ = P for all points P on E.
Elliptic curve encryption involves the use of a single point P on an elliptic
curve and a secret “exponent” n. To encrypt, one computes nP which is done most
efficiently through the use of a double and add system. Let n with length w be
given by the binary representation b1b2 . . . bw. We may assume that b1 = 1 and n is
read left to right in the intuitive way. We follow this procedure:
1. Let k = 1, and S1 = 0.
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2. If bk = 1, let Rk = Sk + P . If bk = 0, let Rk = Sk.
3. Let Sk+1 = Rk +Rk.
4. If k = w, stop, If k < w, increment k and return to step 2.
Notice that Sk + P is only computed if bk = 1, but in both cases, 2Rk is found.
1.1.2 RSA Encryption
In Kocher’s paper, he outlines the use of RSA timing attacks. To decrypt a
ciphertext y using RSA, one computes yd mod n where d is a secret decryption key
and n is the public product of two secret primes denoted p, q. The above steps are
modified as follows:
1. Let k = 1, and s1 = 1.
2. If bk = 1, let rk = sky mod n. If bk = 0, let rk = sk.
3. Let sk+1 = r
2
k mod n.
4. If k = w, stop, If k < w, increment k and return to step 2.




For both elliptic curve and RSA encryption, a timing attack is based on the
assumption that a bit’s value changes the amount of time it takes for a computer
to complete steps 2 and 3. The theory, described by Kocher in [1], is also the same
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for both encryption methods. From statistics, we know that if two processes are
independent, the sum of their variances is the same as the variance of their sum.
Thus if total time t = t′ + t′′ then V ar({t}) = V ar({t′}) + V ar({t′′}).
For exposition purposes, we will write the group law additively (as in the
elliptic curve case). Assume that eavesdropper Eve knows the plaintexts Yi and the
total amount of time it takes to compute nYi. Assume that she also knows bits
b1 . . . bk−1 of the coefficient n. Since Eve knows each Yi, and the hardware being
used, she can time how long it takes to compute R1, . . . Rk−1 in the above algorithm
for each Yi and then subtract to determine how long it takes to find Rk, . . . Rw. Call
this time ti for each Yi.
Eve wants to know if bk = 1 or bk = 0. As mentioned above, if bk = 1 then
Sk + P is computed. If bk = 0 this addition is not performed. Let t
′
i be the amount
of time it takes to do this addition step and let t′′i = ti − t′i. Effectively, t′′i is the
amount of time it takes to do everything after the supposed addition. Note that at
this point, Eve does not know whether or not the addition occurs. However, she may
assume that it does, time the computation and then find V ar({ti}) and V ar({t′′i }).
If the addition does occur, then we may assume that t′i and t
′′
i are independent times
and therefore
V ar({ti}) ≈ V ar({t′i}) + V ar({t′′i }) > V ar({t′′i }). (1.1)
If the addition does not occur, then t′i is not part of the actual computations done
so ti and t
′
i are independent and
V ar({t′′i }) ≈ V ar({ti}) + V ar({−t′i}) > V ar({ti}). (1.2)
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For all of the following implementations, except for Sage, computations were
performed on a 2.93 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo CPU running a 64-bit Windows OS.
Sage computations were performed on a Linux virtual machine.
2.1.1 Elliptic Curve Attack
2.1.1.1 Sage
We first used Sage because of its existing elliptic curve infrastructure. The
code used in Sage can be found in Appendix A. The elliptic curve used is the
NIST-521 curve with parameters (in Sage):
• p = 2521 − 1
• A = p− 3




Figure 1 shows a histogram of 500 elliptic curve multiplications. The x-axis gives the
total time observed to compute nP and the y-axis shows the frequency of an observed
time. The same random 160-bit integer was used for the coefficient and the 500
points were found using Sage’s E.random point() function. For timing, the built-
in cputime() function was called. The data in Figure 1 have a mean of 0.01953702s
and a standard deviation of 0.0051370s. Similar to Kocher’s observations, the data
shows a rough bell curve. While we were unable to exactly determine the resolution
of the cputime() function, based on the times observed, we assume that it is no
better than the nearest microsecond, but possibly worse. This is reflected in the
gaps between bars on the histogram as some times were not observed.
To determine the stability of a given computation time, we repeated the mul-
tiplication nP with the same 160-bit n 30 times for each P and observed the time.
The standard deviation of the 30 measured times was computed. Figure 2 shows a
histogram of this data. The x-axis gives the standard deviation and the y-axis shows
the number of points for which a standard deviation was observed. Most points had
a standard deviation of less than 4ms, indicating reasonable stability.
Next, we measured the time to compute nP for a single P and 500 choices for
n to understand how measurements would vary for different 160-bit integers. Figure
3 shows a histogram of the results. In this graph the x-axis gives the total time to
computte nP and the y-axis shows the number of coefficients n for which the total
time was observed. We see a rough variation in the data, but also the same problem
as in Figure 1 with some intermediate times not observed.
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Figure 1: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, Sage
Figure 2: Standard Deviations for Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, Sage
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Figure 3: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times for 500 160-bit Coefficients, Sage
When the timing attack was attempted, it was not successful. First, we used
a small coefficient n = 57 = 1110012 thinking that a small coefficient is similar to
knowing only a couple of bits of large exponent. We assumed that 5 bits were known
and set n = 110012. In 100 repetitions of the attack guessing only 1 bit, the correct
bit was guessed 45 times and incorrect bit 55 times for 45% accuracy. Next, we used
a large, 160-bit coefficient with 159 bits assumed known. In 100 repetitions of the
attack guessing only 1 bit, the correct bit was guessed 51 times and the incorrect
bit 49 times for 51% accuracy. In both cases, time measurements from 500 random
elliptic curve points were used to compute the variances. Note that this is double
the number of inputs that Kocher used.
The timing attack theory says that when an incorrect bit is guessed, we should
see larger variances than prior to the incorrect guess. We tested the attack with
80 of 160 bits known and observed the results and variances. Table 2.1 shows the
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results of 5 repetitions of the attack. Column 1 gives the bit at which an incorrect
guess was made, column 2 gives the variances observed at the incorrectly guessed
bit, and column 3 gives the variances observed at the end of the attack. The two
variances which are compared in the theory are listed V ar(t′′) first and V ar(t)
underneath. The variances observed at the end of the attack are nearly double the
variances observed at the incorrect bit. However, this increase is very gradual, not
the expected spike. Variances that are less than or equal to the variances at the
incorrect bit were seen at least 10 bits later in each test.











Table 2.1: Changes in Variance After an Incorrect Bit is Guessed During an Elliptic
Curve Timing Attack
Given the above observations, the exact reason that an elliptic curve attack
does not work in Sage is not clear. The data collected are normally distributed
and the timing resolution was expected to be refined enough. Even using a larger
number of points did not successfully yield reasonable accuracy. It is possible that
Sage computes elliptic curve multiplications so quickly and that the code to do so is
significantly optimized as to skew observed time data. In addition, the precision and




We next attempted to implement the elliptic curve timing attack in Matlab
because of its perceived slowness. Due to the size of the parameters for the NIST-521
curve, Matlab’s symbolic engine MuPAD was used to carry out the elliptic curve
multiplication. The code for these operations was modified from code written by
Dr. Rosenberg found at [2]. The modified code can be found in Appendix B.
First, 500 points on the NIST-521 curve were multiplied by a 160-bit integer.
The computations were timed using MuPAD’s time() function which measures
CPU time in milliseconds. Figure 4 shows a histogram of the times observed. In
this graph, the x-axis gives the total time observed to compute nP and the y-axis
gives the frequency of a measured time. Interestingly, the fractional milliseconds
were always the same for a given whole millisecond. For example, a computation
that took between 78ms and 79ms would always be recorded as 78.0005ms. This
fact can be seen in the large gaps between bars in the histogram. The data shown
in the histogram has a mean of 61.995ms and a standard deviation of 7.478ms. Out
of the 500 points used, only 4 had multiplication time less than 40ms. This analysis
was completed on two sets of timing data and the means differed by approximately
3ms and standard deviations by approximately 2ms. While the observed times in
Figure 4 do appear to have a rough bell shape, such little variation is a concern for
timing attacks.
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We next wanted to check the stability of timing data with the intent to use
an average time for the attack if necessary. To determine how much timing data
may change from one iteration to the next, we timed 30 repetitions of the same
computation nP for the 500 points and 160-bit integer used earlier. The results
can be seen in Figure 5. Here the x-axis represents the standard deviation of the
30 repetitions, the y-axis counts the number of points for which a given standard
deviation was observed. The data shown in this graph have a mean of 5.2048ms
and have a rough bell shape. In all tests, the first time was larger than all subse-
quent times. It was discovered that Matlab caches computations using a built-in
remember() function. This function saves the results of large computations and is
intended to speed up repeated operations. For that reason, it is not possible to
completely eliminate caching making averaging an ineffective method to guarantee
timing stability.
We also wanted to ensure that for a given point, there would be enough varia-
tion in timing data to distinguish between different 160-bit integers. Figure 6 shows
the observed time for multiplication of a single point with 500 different 160-bit in-
tegers. The x-axis gives the time to compute nP for a single P and 500 different
160-bit n. The y-axis gives the frequency of an observed time. Once again, the
graph shows very little variation. Additionally, all data points counted at one bar
were recorded as exactly the same time.
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Figure 4: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, MuPAD
Figure 5: Standard Deviations for Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, MuPAD
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Figure 6: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times for 500 160-bit Coefficients, MuPAD
When the timing attack was attempted, it did not work. We started with a
small coefficient, n = 57 = 1110012 and bits known. In 50 repetitions, the correct
bit was guessed 13 times and incorrect bit 37 times for 26% accuracy. Then we
attempted a large (160-bit) coefficient with 159 bits known. In 50 repetitions, the
correct bit was guessed 23 times and incorrect bit 27 times for 46% accuracy.
We concluded that while MuPAD may be slow enough, there is not enough
precision in the time measurement and consequently variation to distinguish between
bits.
2.1.1.3 Mathematica
We next chose to try implementing in Mathematica hoping that increased
precision could be obtained. Unfortunately, precision for Mathematica is dependent
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on the machine used and was only to the nearest millisecond. Using the timing[]
function we timed 500 elliptic curve multiplications with the same 160-bit integer
coefficient.
Figure 7 shows the resulting distribution. In this graph the x-axis represents
the time observed to compute nP and the y-axis shows the frequency of the time
observed. The data in Figure 7 have a mean of .0159s and standard deviation of
.0027s. Similar to the data collected from MuPAD, the Mathematica data showed
a lack of variation. All multiplications counted in the bar at .015s were recorded
as .0156s. Figure 8 shows a histogram of standard deviations for 30 repetitions of
multiplication with the same 160-bit coefficient for each of the 500 points. Nearly 90
points have a standard deviation of 0.0s while most points have a standard deviation
between .002s and .01s.
Additionally, we timed the multiplication of one point with 500 different 160
bit integers. Figure 9 gives a histogram of the results where the x-axis gives total
computation time in seconds and the y-axis shows the number of coefficients n which
took a given time. Nearly all of the points had an observed time of 0.0156s. These
results were not better than those for MuPAD so a timing attack was not attempted
in Mathematica.
The code that obtained these results can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 7: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, Mathematica
Figure 8: Standard Deviations for Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times, Mathemat-
ica
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Figure 9: Elliptic Curve Multiplication Times for 500 160-bit Coefficients, Mathe-
matica
2.1.2 RSA Attack
Based on the difficulty in obtaining data which is consistent and varied enough
for the elliptic curve timing attack, we returned to Kocher’s original attack on RSA.
We used RSA-704/212 with parameters
• p = 90912135295978188784406583026004374858926083103283587204285121689
60411528640933367824950788367956756806141
• q = 14385925911004526572780912628442933587789900216762788320091417242
9324360133004116702003240828777970252499.
2.1.2.1 Python
We attempted to implement the RSA attack in Python. The time.perf counter()
function with .3µs resolution was used to measure CPU time spent on computations.
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Figure 10: Modular Exponentiation Times, Python
Figure 10 shows the histogram of 500 exponentiations using a 254 bit exponent. The
data shown has a mean of 273.1µs and standard deviation of 160µs. Upon repe-
tition, mean total time differed by less than 5µs. and standard deviation by less
than 45µs. Compared to Kocher’s original data, the total time was 3 orders of
magnitude faster. We next checked the stability of timing data by computing the
standard deviation of 30 repetitions of the same computation ye for the 500 points
used above. As can be seen in Figure 11, for most points the standard deviation
was less than 100µs.
We next attempted to complete the timing attack in Python. The code for
this attack can be found in Appendix D. We began with a small exponent d = 57 =
1110012 and 5 bits known, d = 110012, under the assumption that finding a small
exponent would be equivalent to determining the first few bits of a large exponent.
In 50 repetitions of this code, the correct final bit was guessed 25 times with 25
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Figure 11: Standard Deviations for Modular Exponentiation Times, Python
incorrect guesses for 50% accuracy. Next, we used a large (254-bit) exponent with
253 bits known. In 50 repetitions of the attack, the correct final bit was guessed 20
times with 30 incorrect guesses for 40% accuracy.
In an attempt to determine the reason for such failure, we compared the expo-
nent size and standard deviation of the total time distribution. We used 52 different
exponents of ranging from 20-bit length to 1040-bit length. For each exponent, each
dot in Figure 12 represents the standard deviation of the total time distribution
for that exponent. The process was repeated 10 times for each exponent. As the
exponent gets larger, we see greater spread in the standard deviations measured,
indicating that the timing data does not remain consistent and may not be reliable.
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Figure 12: Total Time Standard Deviations for Modular Exponents of Different
Lengths
Today’s RSA encryptions typically use much larger decryption exponents. Fig-
ure 13 shows a histogram of the total time for computing yd mod n when d is a
1024-bit integer. The data shown has a mean of 10.57ms and a standard deviation
of .3968ms. These computations take significantly more time than those with the
256-bit exponent, but still 1 order or magnitude less than the times Kocher observed.
Figure 14 shows a histogram of standard deviations. For each y-value the standard
deviation of 30 timed repetitions of yd for a 1024-bit d were calculated. The x-axis
gives the standard deviation and the y-axis gives the frequency of a given standard
deviation. This suggests that at the 1024-bit level, we may be able to use a timing
attack to determine the next bit. However, given the earlier data, it is not likely
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Figure 13: Modular Exponentiation Times for 1024-bit Exponent, Python
we would be able to start from 0 known bits and guess the entire exponent with
reasonable success.
21





Nearly 20 years have passed since Kocher’s results were published. In that
time, the computer industry has seen the introduction of multi-core CPU’s and
parallel processing. In Kocher’s paper, he observes modular multiplication times
which take at least 1ms and modular exponentiation times which take at least
400ms. The computer he used had a 120-MHz Pentium processor running MSDOS.
The results we obtained were from a computer running a 2.93-GHz Intel Core 2 Duo
processor. We saw modular exponentiation times around 2.7ms. While the times
we observed were only 2 orders of magnitude faster than those from 1996, there
are potential complications introduced by the dual core processor. In particular, a
scenario where the timing function is carried out by one processor and the actual
computation by another would be a problematic for obtaining accurate timing.
In the future, it is not unreasonable to expect parallelization of the actual
computation [3](especially if a GPU is utilized by the user’s encryption software).
This results in extremely fast computations compared to those not parallelized. An
especially fast computation in itself is not a problem. However, computations so
fast that bit differences cannot be distinguished eliminates the possibility of a tim-
23
ing attack. Thus for a timing attack to be viable in the future, we must have timers
with large CPU time precision to counteract the increased speed of the computa-
tions. Assuming that a timing function is precise enough to measure a computation
with a small exponent, that measurement must be distinguishable from one where
the exponent differs by a single bit with variation in timing accounted for. Even
with an accurate and precise timing device, lack of consistency will make single bit
changes indistinguishable. Any person trying to implement a timing attack must be
sure to use the same exact computer specifications and encryption implementation.





Based on the data collected and analysis above, it is suggested that timing
attacks may no longer be a viable way to obtain a secret key in both the elliptic
curve and RSA methods. An eavesdropper Eve is assumed to have access to the
ciphertexts and the total time it took to decrypt each ciphertext with the same secret
key. However, the accuracy, precision and consistency of the timing data observed
by an eavesdropper are not guaranteed especially if optimization techniques such as
parallelization are used for fast computation. Additionally, our observations show
it is unlikely that an eavesdropper would be able to accurately determine an entire
secret exponent starting with the first bit due to such small, fast computations and
timer precision. Given these obstacles, we do not believe that timing attacks will
be a good use of resources to determine a secret key.
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Chapter A: Sage Files
A.1 SageCode
# Randomly gene ra t e s po in t s and s e c r e t c o e f f c i e n t c
p = 2ˆ521 − 1
F = GF(p)




E = El l i p t i cCurve ( [ F(A) , F(B) ] )
from sage . misc . prandom import randrange
#c= ge t randb i t s (160)
import numpy
Points10000=numpy . array ( [ ] )
f o r i in range (10000 ) :
Pi=E. random point ( )
Points10000= numpy . append ( Points10000 , [ Pi ] )
save ( Points10000 , ’ Points10000 ’ )
#save ( c , ’C’ )
#c
# Mul i p l i e s c∗Points
import numpy
#import sage . misc . t r a c e
Points = load ( ’ Points500 ’ )
c = load ( ’C’ )
#c=57
p = 2ˆ521 − 1
F = GF(p)





E = El l i p t i cCurve ( [ F(A) , F(B) ] )
Time = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
#Make sure that po in t s are o f type ECPoint
Pt=[ ]
f o r i in range (0 , l en ( Points ) , 3 ) :
Pi = E( Points [ i ] , Points [ i +1] , Points [ i +2])
Pt=Pt+[Pi ]
f o r j in range ( l en (Pt ) ) :
t i = cputime ( )
=c∗Pt [ j ]
c i=cputime ( t i )
Time = numpy . append (Time , [ c i ] )
Time
#E l l i p t i c Curve Timing Attack
import numpy
Points = load ( ’ Points500 ’ )
p = 2ˆ521 − 1
F = GF(p)




E = El l i p t i cCurve ( [ F(A) , F(B) ] )
c=load ( ’C’ )
#c=57
cBin=bin ( c )
l en ( cBin )
# Let w g ive the number o f known b i t s
w=159 #when c i s 160−b i t
#w=5 #when c i s 6 b i t s
#w=80 #t e s t l ength
cBin = cBin [ 2 : l en ( cBin ) ]
KnownBitsInit = cBin [ 1 :w]
KnownBits=KnownBitsInit
KnownBitsIntInit=in t ( s t r (KnownBits ) , base=2)
KnownBitsInt=KnownBitsInit
p r i n t ( cBin )
Pt =[ ]
f o r i in range (0 , l en ( Points ) , 3 ) :
Pi = E( Points [ i ] , Points [ i +1] , Points [ i +2])
Pt = Pt+[Pi ]
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Time=numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
f o r i in range ( l en (Pt ) ) :
t i=cputime ( )
=c∗Pt [ i ]
c i=cputime ( t i )
Time=numpy . append (Time , [ c i ] )
f o r n in range ( 1 0 0 ) :
KnownBits=KnownBitsInit
KnownBitsInt=KnownBitsIntInit
KnownTime = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
f o r k in range ( l en (Pt ) ) :
tk = cputime ( )
=KnownBitsInt∗Pt [ k ]
ck=cputime ( tk )
KnownTime = numpy . append (KnownTime , [ ck ] )
t=Time−KnownTime
vart= var iance ( t )
f o r j in range ( l en ( cBin)−w) :
NextBit0 = KnownBits+ ’0 ’
NextBit1 = KnownBits+ ’1 ’
INextBit0 = in t ( s t r ( NextBit0 ) , base=2)
INextBit1 = in t ( s t r ( NextBit1 ) , base=2)
Time NextBit1 = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
Time NextBit0 = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
f o r j in range ( l en (Pt ) ) :
t j NextB i t1 = cputime ( )
=INextBit1 ∗Pt [ j ]
t j 1=cputime ( t j NextB i t1 )
Time NextBit1 = numpy . append ( Time NextBit1 , [ t j 1 ] )
t j NextB i t0 = cputime ( )
=INextBit0 ∗Pt [ j ]
t j 0=cputime ( t j NextB i t0 )
Time NextBit0=numpy . append ( Time NextBit0 , [ t j 0 ] )
tPrime = Time NextBit1−KnownTime
TimeDiff1 = t−tPrime
v1=var iance ( TimeDiff1 )
#v1
#vart




vart=var iance ( t )
p r i n t ( INextBit1 )




vart=var iance ( t )
p r i n t ( INextBit0 )
e l s e :
p r i n t ( ’ Same var iance ’ )
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#Gather Standard Deviat ion Data
import numpy
Points = load ( ’ Points500 ’ )
c = load ( ’C’ )
p = 2ˆ521 − 1
F = GF(p)




E = El l i p t i cCurve ( [ F(A) , F(B) ] )
StdDevs = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
Reps=numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
Pt=[ ]
f o r i in range (0 , l en ( Points ) , 3 ) :
Pi = E( Points [ i ] , Points [ i +1] , Points [ i +2])
Pt=Pt+[Pi ]
l en (Pt )
f o r j in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
f o r k in range ( 0 , 3 0 ) :
tk = cputime ( )
=c∗Pt [ j ]
ck=cputime ( tk )
Reps=numpy . append (Reps , ck )
StdDevs = numpy . append ( StdDevs , std (Reps ) )
StdDevs
#Mult ip ly s i n g l e po int by 500 160−b i t I n t e g e r s
import numpy
Points=load ( ’ Points500 ’ )
Coe f f s=load ( ’ Coef fs500 ’ )
Pt=[ ]
f o r i in range (0 , l en ( Points ) , 3 ) :
Pi = E( Points [ i ] , Points [ i +1] , Points [ i +2])
Pt=Pt+[Pi ]
l en (Pt )
Times=numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
f o r i in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
t i= cputime ( )
=Coe f f s [ i ]∗Pt [ 1 4 3 ]
c i=cputime ( t i )






Chapter B: MuPAD Files
B.1 ellcurve.mu
plug in :=proc (x , a , b , n , b i t )
local y2 , y ;
begin
y2 := mod(xˆ3+a∗x+b , n ) :
i f numlib : : l e gendre ( y2 , n)=1
then y :=numlib : : sqrtmodp (y2 , n ) ;
i f b i t=1 then
re turn (y )
else
re turn ( mod(−y , n ) )
end if ;
else re turn (0 )
end if ;
end proc :
testEC := (x , y , a , b , n ) −> i f ( x=i n f i n i t y and y=i n f i n i t y )
or mod(xˆ3+a∗x+b−yˆ2 , n) = 0
then TRUE else FALSE end if :
addEC := proc ( x1 , y1 , x2 , y2 , a , b , n )
local z , m, num, den , x3 ;
begin
i f ( x1=i n f i n i t y and y1=i n f i n i t y )
then re turn ( [ x2 , y2 ] ) end if ;
i f ( x2=i n f i n i t y and y2=i n f i n i t y )
then re turn ( [ x1 , y1 ] ) end if ;
i f ( x1=x2 and y1=y2 and y1=0)
then re turn ( [ i n f i n i t y , i n f i n i t y ] ) end if ;
i f ( x1=x2 and y1<>y2 )
then re turn ( [ i n f i n i t y , i n f i n i t y ] ) end if ;
i f ( x1=x2 and y1=y2 ) then den :=2∗y1 else
den :=x2−x1 end if :
z := gcd ( den , n ) :
i f ( z<>1 and z<>n)
then pr in t ( ” found f a c t o r o f n” , z ) ;
r e turn ( ) end if :
i f ( x1=x2 and y1=y2 ) then num:=3∗x1ˆ2+a else
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num:=y2−y1 end if :
m := mod(1/ den ,n)∗num:
x3 := mod(mˆ2 − x1 −x2 , n ) :
r e turn ( [ x3 , mod(m∗( x1−x3)−y1 , n ) ] )
end proc :
multEC := proc (k , mult )
local z , out , x1 , y1 ;
begin
read ( ”C:\\ Users \\Cla r i c e \\SkyDrive \\Documents\\ School \\MatlabFi les \\521 Points1000 ” ) :
z := mult :
out :=[ i n f i n i t y , i n f i n i t y ] :
x1 :=Xvals [ k ] :





while ( mod( z , 2 ) )=0 do
z :=z /2 :
[ x1 , y1 ] := addEC(x1 , y1 , x1 , y1 ,A,B, n ) :
f o r g e t (addEC ) ;
end while :
z :=z−1:
out := addEC(x1 , y1 , out [ 1 ] , out [ 2 ] ,A,B, n ) :
f o r g e t (addEC ) ;
end while ;









Load nece s sa ry f i l e s
r e s e t ( ) ;
d e l e t e HISTORY;
HISTORY;
read (”C:\\ Users \\Cla r i c e \\SkyDrive \\Documents\\ School
\\MatlabFi les \\ e l l c u r v e .mu” ) ;
read (”C:\\ Users \\Cla r i c e \\SkyDrive \\Documents\\ School









Generate 500 , 160−b i t c o e f f i c i e n t s
C: = [ ] :
IntC : = [ ] :
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
C:=append (C, s t r i n g l i b : : random (160 , [ ” 0” , ” 1” ] , P r e f i x= ”1” ) ) ;
IntC:=append ( IntC , t e x t 2 i n t (C[ i ] , 2 ) ) ;
end fo r :
wr i t e (”160 Coe f f ” , IntC ) ;
IntC ;
Mult ip ly 500 160−b i t C o e f f i c i e n t s by 1 po int
read (”160 Coef f ” ) :
read (”C:\\ Users \\Cla r i c e \\SkyDrive \\Documents\\ School
\\MatlabFi les \\ e l l c u r v e .mu” ) ;
TimeSinglePoint : = [ ] ;
f o r j from 1 to 500 do
t i :=time (multEC(2 , IntC [ j ] ) ) :
TimeSinglePoint :=append ( TimeSinglePoint , t i ) :
end fo r :
TimeSinglePoint ;
Find Standard Deviat ion f o r same Point and Co e f f i c i e n t
Repeated 30 t imes
IntC :=1241632396484394193694744905331410247131251011868:
StdDevs : = [ ] :
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
Reps : = [ ] :
f o r j from 1 to 30 do
t i :=time (multEC( i , IntC ) ) :
Reps:=append (Reps , t i )
end fo r :
StdDevs :=append ( StdDevs , s t a t s : : s tdev (Reps ) ) :
end fo r :
StdDevs ;
The E l l i p t i c Curve t iming attack
HISTORY:=0:
r e s e t ( ) ;
read (”C:\\ Users \\Cla r i c e \\SkyDrive \\Documents\\ School
\\MatlabFi les \\ e l l c u r v e .mu” ) ;










BinC:= in t 2 t e x t ( IntC , 2 ) :
KnownBits:=BinC [ 1 . . 1 5 9 ] :
KnownBitsInt := t ex t 2 i n t (KnownBits , 2 ) :
Large c o e f f c i e n t
TotalTime : = [ ] ;
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
t i :=time (multEC( i , IntC ) ) :
TotalTime:=append (TotalTime , t i ) ;
HISTORY:=0:
end fo r :
f o r k from 1 to 10 do :
HISTORY:=0:
KnownBits:=BinC [ 1 . . 1 5 9 ] :
KnownBitsInt := t ex t 2 i n t (KnownBits , 2 ) :
KnownTimes : = [ ] :
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
t i k :=time (multEC( i , KnownBitsInt ) ) :
KnownTimes:=append (KnownTimes , t i k ) :
end fo r :
t :=TotalTime−KnownTimes :
vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
f o r j from 1 to 1 do
NextBit0 :=KnownBits . ” 0 ” :
NextBit1 :=KnownBits . ” 1 ” :
INextBit1 := t ex t 2 i n t ( NextBit1 , 2 ) :
INextBit0 := t ex t 2 i n t ( NextBit0 , 2 ) :
TimeNB1 : = [ ] :
TimeNB0 : = [ ] :
f o r l from 1 to 500 do
TimeNB1:=append (TimeNB1 , time (multEC( l , INextBit1 ) ) ) :
TimeNB0:=append (TimeNB0 , time (multEC( l , INextBit0 ) ) ) :
end fo r :
tprime :=TimeNB1−KnownTimes :
TimeDiff1 :=t−tprime :
v1:= s t a t s : : va r i ance ( TimeDiff1 ) :
p r i n t ( vart ) ;
p r i n t ( v1 ) ;
i f ( v1<vart )
then KnownBits:= NextBit1 :
KnownTimes:= TimeNB1 :
t :=TotalTime−KnownTimes :
vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
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pr in t ( INextBit1 ) ;




vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
p r i n t ( INextBit0 ) ;
e l s e p r i n t (”Same Variance ”) e nd i f ;
end fo r :
end fo r :
E l l i p t i c Curve attack with smal l c o e f f c i e n t
IntC :=57;
BinC:= in t 2 t e x t ( IntC , 2 ) :
KnownBits:=BinC [ 1 . . 5 ] :
KnownBitsInt := t ex t 2 i n t (KnownBits , 2 ) :
TotalTime : = [ ] ;
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
t i :=time (multEC( i , IntC ) ) :
TotalTime:=append (TotalTime , t i ) ;
HISTORY:=0:
end fo r :
f o r k from 1 to 10 do :
KnownBits:=BinC [ 1 . . 5 ] :
KnownBitsInt := t ex t 2 i n t (KnownBits , 2 ) :
KnownTimes : = [ ] :
f o r i from 1 to 500 do
t i k :=time (multEC( i , KnownBitsInt ) ) :
KnownTimes:=append (KnownTimes , t i k ) :
end fo r :
t :=TotalTime−KnownTimes :
vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
f o r j from 1 to 1 do
NextBit0 :=KnownBits . ” 0 ” :
NextBit1 :=KnownBits . ” 1 ” :
INextBit1 := t ex t 2 i n t ( NextBit1 , 2 ) :
INextBit0 := t ex t 2 i n t ( NextBit0 , 2 ) :
TimeNB1 : = [ ] :
TimeNB0 : = [ ] :
f o r l from 1 to 500 do
TimeNB1:=append (TimeNB1 , time (multEC( l , INextBit1 ) ) ) :
TimeNB0:=append (TimeNB0 , time (multEC( l , INextBit0 ) ) ) :
end fo r :
tprime :=TimeNB1−KnownTimes :
TimeDiff1 :=t−tprime :
v1:= s t a t s : : va r i ance ( TimeDiff1 ) :
i f ( v1<vart )
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then KnownBits:= NextBit1 :
KnownTimes:= TimeNB1 :
t :=TotalTime−KnownTimes :
vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
p r i n t ( INextBit1 ) ;




vart := s t a t s : : va r i ance ( t ) :
p r i n t ( INextBit0 ) ;
e l s e p r i n t (”Same Variance ”) e n d i f ;
end fo r :
end fo r :
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Chapter C: Mathematica Files
C.1 EllipticCurve.m
(∗ This computes us ing E l l i p t i c Curves over a f i e l d o f d e f i n i t i o n
that i s a prime ( f i n i t e ) f i e l d o f order p . The curve i s in
Weie r s t ra s s form yˆ2 = xˆ3 + ax + b and the po in t s are a l s o
in Weie r s t ra s s ( a f f i n e ) form . ∗)
BeginPackage [ ” E l l i p t i cCurve ‘ ” ]
ECPt : : usage=\
”ECPt [{ x , y} , {a , b} , p ] r e p r e s en t s the po int {x , y} on the e l l i p t i c \
curve yˆ2 = xˆ3 + ax + b over the i n t e g e r s mod p . The ope ra t i on s o f \
add i t i on and mu l t i p l i c a t i o n by an i n t e g e r are implemented . ” ;
RandomECPt : : usage=\
”RandomECPt [{ a , b} , p ] r e tu rn s a random point on the e l l i p t i c curve \
yˆ2 = xˆ3 + ax + b over the i n t e g e r s mod p . Before computing , t h i s \
performs a san i ty check to see i f ( not implemented ) \
the curve i s non−s i n gu l a r . ” ;
IdentityECPt : : usage=\
” IdentityECPt [{ a , b} , p ] r e tu rn s the i d e n t i t y po int on the s p e c i f i e d
curve . ” ;
OrderECPt : : usage=\
”OrderECPt [ECPt [ . . . ] ] computes the order o f the po int on the e l l i p t i c \
curve . ” ;
Begin [ ” ‘ Pr ivate ‘ ” ]
Format [ECPt [{ x , y } ,{ a , b } , p ] ] := {x , y } ;
Format [ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b } , p ] ] := {0} ;
ECPt/ :ECPt [{ x1 , y1 } ,{ a , b } , p ] + ECPt [{ x2 , y2 } ,{ a , b } , p ] := \
Module [{m, x3 , y3 , xgcd } ,
I f [ x1 == x2 && Mod[ y1+y2 , p ] == 0 ,
ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b} , p ] ,
(∗ Else ∗)
m = I f [ x1 == x2 ,
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xgcd = ExtendedGCD[2∗ y1 , p ] ;
Mod[ ( 3∗ x1ˆ2+a )∗ xgcd [ [ 2 , 1 ] ] , p ] ,
(∗ Else ∗)
xgcd = ExtendedGCD [ x1−x2 , p ] ;
Mod [ ( y1−y2 )∗ xgcd [ [ 2 , 1 ] ] , p ] ] ;
I f [ xgcd [ [ 1 ] ] != 1 ,
Pr int [ ” Found f a c t o r o f ” , xgcd [ [ 1 ] ] ] ;
Abort [ ] ] ;
x3 = Mod[mˆ2 − x1 − x2 , p ] ;
y3 = Mod[−m∗( x3−x1 ) − y1 , p ] ;
ECPt [{ x3 , y3 } ,{a , b} , p ] ] ]
ECPt/ : ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b } , p ] + ECPt [ pt2 ,{ a , b } , p ] := \
ECPt [ pt2 ,{ a , b} , p ]
ECPt/ : −ECPt [{ x , y } ,{ a , b } , p ] := ECPt [{ x ,Mod[−y , p ]} ,{ a , b} , p ]
ECPt/ : n In t eg e r ∗ ECPt [{ x , y } ,{ a , b } , p ] := \
Module [{mult=n , accum=ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b} , p ] ,
powpt=ECPt [{ x , y} ,{a , b} , p ]} ,
I f [ mult < 0 , powpt = −powpt ; mult = −mult ] ;
Pr int ”Here ” ;
While [ mult != 0 ,
I f [OddQ[ mult ] , accum = accum + powpt ; mult = mult−1] ;
powpt = powpt + powpt ;
mult = mult / 2 ] ;
accum ]
IdentityECPt [{ a , b } , p ] := ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b} , p ]
RandomECPt [{ a , b } , p ] := \
Module [{ x , y} ,
(∗ Sanity check f i r s t : I s {a , b} a non−s i n gu l a r curve ∗)
(∗ Don ’ t check f o r p r ima l i t y so we can use f o r EC f a c t o r i n g
I f [ ! PrimeQ [ p ] ,
Message [ECPt : : notprime , p ] ;
Return [ECPt [ I n f i n i t y ,{ a , b} , p ] ] ] ; ∗)
(∗ Find the f i r s t va lue o f x f o r which xˆ3 + ax + b
has a square root ∗)
x = Random [ Integer ,{0 , p−1} ] ;
While [ JacobiSymbol [ xˆ3+a∗x+b , p ] != 1 , x=Mod[ x+1,p ] ] ;
y = PowerMod [ xˆ3+a∗x+b ,1/2 ,p ] ;
ECPt [{ x , y} ,{a , b} , p ] ] ;
ECPt : : notprime = ”ECPt only de f ined f o r prime f i e l d s ,
‘ 1 ‘ i s not prime ” ;
OrderECPt [ pt :ECPt [{ x , y } ,{ a , b } , p ] ] := \
Module [{ accum = pt , i =1, id = IdentityECPt [{ a , b} , p ]} ,
While [ ( accum =!= id ) && ( i <= p+1+2∗Sqrt [ p ] ) ,
accum += pt ; i ++];
i ]
End [ ] ; (∗ El l ip t i cCurve ‘ Private ‘ ∗)
(∗ Protect [ the names ] ∗)
Pr int [ Names [ ” E l l i p t i cCurve ‘ ∗ ” ] , ” have been de f ined . ” ] ;
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EndPackage [ ] (∗ El l ip t i cCurve ‘ ∗)
C.2 ErrorAnalysis.nb
CInt = FromDigits [ RandomChoice [{0 , 1} , 1 60 ] , 2 ]
Points=Table ;
Points << C:\ Users \Cla r i c e \SkyDrive\Documents\School \




TotalTime=Table [ F i r s t [ Timing [ CInt∗Points [ [ i ] ] ] ] , { i , 5 0 0 } ] ;
376560096055051555448332120890000974689596476916
Points=Table ;
Points << C:\ Users \Cla r i c e \SkyDrive\Documents\School \
MathematicaFi les \521 Points500 ;
<< C:\ Users \Cla r i c e \SkyDrive\Documents\School \





StdDevs=Table [ StandardDeviat ion [
Table [ F i r s t [ Timing [ CInt∗Points [ [ i ] ] ] ] , { 3 0 } ] ] , { i , 500} ]
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Chapter D: Python Files
D.1 DataAnalysis.py
import p i c k l e




yva l sF i l e = open ( ” yva l s . p i c k l ed ” , ” rb” )
YVals = p i c k l e . load ( yva l sF i l e )
y v a l sF i l e . c l o s e ( )
#256 Bit Expon
#exponFi le = open (” expon . p i c k l e d ” , ” rb ”)
#Expon = p i c k l e . load ( exponFi l e )
















TotalTime = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
TotalTime2= numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
StdDevs = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
#Averages = numpy . array ( [ ] , d type=ob j e c t )
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#Compute Time Data or Standard Dev ia t ions .
#Must change inden t s and remove ’#’
for y in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
#Reps = numpy . array ( [ ] , d type=ob j e c t )
#fo r x in range (30 ) :
t i c = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#YVals [1]∗∗5%n
pow(YVals [ y ] , Expon , n)
toc = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#Reps = numpy . append (Reps , toc−t i c )
TotalTime=numpy . append (TotalTime , toc−t i c )
#StdDevs= numpy . append ( StdDevs , numpy . s t d (Reps ) )
#Averages = numpy . append ( Averages , [ s t a t i s t i c s .mean(Reps [ i : i +20])
#fo r i in range (1 , 200 , 20 ) ] )
print ( TotalTime )
print ( s t a t i s t i c s .mean( TotalTime ) )
print (numpy . std ( TotalTime ) )
#pr in t ( StdDevs )
#pr i n t ( Averages )
D.2 ExponLengthVStdDev.py
import i o
import p i c k l e
import numpy
import time
yva l sF i l e = open ( ” yva l s . p i c k l ed ” , ” rb” )
YVals = p i c k l e . load ( yva l sF i l e )
y v a l sF i l e . c l o s e ( )
ExpLi s tF i l e = open ( ”expon500 . p i ck l ed ” , ” rb” )
Expons=p i c k l e . load ( ExpLi s tF i l e )









StdDevs=numpy . ndarray ( shape =(52 ,10) , dtype=ob j e c t )
for i in range ( 5 2 ) :
print ( Expons [ i ] )
for x in range ( 1 0 ) :
Times=numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
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for y in YVals :
t i c=time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
pow(y , Expons [ i ] , n )
toc=time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
Times=numpy . append (Times , toc−t i c )
tSD=numpy . std (Times )
StdDevs [ i , x]=tSD
print ( StdDevs )
D.3 RSATimeAttack.py




import s t a t i s t i c s
y v a l sF i l e = open ( ” yva l s . p i c k l ed ” , ” rb” )
YVals = p i c k l e . load ( yva l sF i l e )
y v a l sF i l e . c l o s e ( )
#256− b i t Exponent
#exponFi le = open (” expon . p i c k l e d ” , ” rb ”)
#Expon = p i c k l e . load ( exponFi l e )

















print ( l en (BinExpon ) )
#160− b i t Exponent
#Expon = 737594632511118677735731068268133317738981665915
#BinExpon=bin (Expon)
#pr i n t ( l en (BinExpon ))
# Repeat the a t t a c k 10 t imes
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for j in range ( 1 0 ) :
TotalTime = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
#Find Tota l Time ( assumed g iven )
for x in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
RepsTot= numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
for z in range ( 1 ) :
t i c = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#x∗∗Expon%n a l t e r n a t e f o r exponen t i a t i on
pow(YVals [ x ] , Expon , n)
toc = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
RepsTot = numpy . append (RepsTot , toc−t i c )
TotalTime = numpy . append (
TotalTime , s t a t i s t i c s .mean(RepsTot ) )
k=len (BinExpon)−1
KnownBits = BinExpon [ 2 : k ]
KnownTime = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
KnownBitsInt = in t (KnownBits , 2)
#Find time known g iven some b i t s are known
for x in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
Reps = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
for z in range ( 1 ) :
t i c = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#x∗∗KnownBitsInt%n
#a l t e r n a t e f o r exponen t i a t i on
pow(YVals [ x ] , KnownBitsInt , n )
toc = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
Reps = numpy . append (Reps , toc−t i c )
KnownTime = numpy . append (
KnownTime , s t a t i s t i c s .mean(Reps ) )
#pr in t (KnownTime)
t= TotalTime−KnownTime
vart = numpy . var ( t )
#Compute t imes f o r both gues se s f o r the next b i t
for j in range ( l en (BinExpon)− l en (KnownBits )−2):
NextBit0 = KnownBits+’ 0 ’
NextBit1 = KnownBits+’ 1 ’
INextBit0 = in t ( s t r ( NextBit0 ) , base=2)
INextBit1 = in t ( s t r ( NextBit1 ) , base=2)
#pr in t ( INextBi t1 )
#pr in t ( INextBi t0 )
TimeNextBit1 = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
TimeNextBit0 = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype=ob j e c t )
for y in range ( 5 0 0 ) :
Reps = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype = ob j e c t )
Reps2 = numpy . array ( [ ] , dtype = ob j e c t )
for z in range ( 5 ) :
t i c 2 = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#y∗∗ INextBi t0%n
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pow(YVals [ y ] , INextBit0 , n)
toc2 = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
Reps2 = numpy . append (Reps2 , toc2−t i c 2 )
t i c = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
#y∗∗ INextBi t1%n
pow(YVals [ y ] , INextBit1 , n)
toc = time . p e r f c oun t e r ( )
Reps = numpy . append (Reps , toc−t i c )
TimeNextBit1 = numpy . append (
TimeNextBit1 , s t a t i s t i c s .mean(Reps ) )
TimeNextBit0 = numpy . append (
TimeNextBit0 , s t a t i s t i c s .mean(Reps2 ) )
tPrime = TimeNextBit1−KnownTime
TimeDiff1 = t−tPrime
v1=numpy . var ( TimeDiff1 )
print ( vart )
print ( v1 )
#Comparison o f var iances f o r the next b i t
i f v1<vart :
KnownBits = NextBit1
#pr in t ( NextBit1 )
KnownTime=TimeNextBit1
t=TotalTime−KnownTime
vart = numpy . var ( t )
e l i f v1>vart :
KnownBits = NextBit0
#pr in t ( NextBit0 )
KnownTime=TimeNextBit0
t=TotalTime−KnownTime
vart = numpy . var ( t )
else :
print ( ’Same var iance ’ )
print ( i n t (KnownBits , 2 ) )
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